Since the Gaza war officially ended in October 2025, the central question has been whether the partial ceasefire could be transformed into a genuine political and security transition – or whether Gaza would remain trapped between continued Israeli military control, Hamas’s armed presence and the absence of a functioning alternative government with more than two million Gazans being held hostage by Hamas and by Israel.
The reported agreement on the disarmament of Hamas may now provide the first serious answer to that question. It could become the most important diplomatic breakthrough since the war ended. Both Israel and Hamas are already disputing what was accepted, and each side is presenting conditions that appear to contradict those of the other.
Nevertheless, something fundamental has changed.
For the first time, Hamas and the other Palestinian factions have reportedly accepted a structured process leading to the removal of their weapons, the transfer of civilian and security authority to a new Palestinian administration, and the replacement of armed factional rule with a Palestinian government, a new police force, international verification and an International Stabilization Force. President Donald Trump has described the agreement as providing for the complete disarmament of Hamas, although Hamas representatives continue to condition implementation on an Israeli withdrawal.
The agreement has become possible because Hamas is now at its weakest point since taking control of Gaza in 2007.
Militarily, politically, administratively and financially, Hamas has been devastated. It no longer possesses the governing capacity it once exercised. Its financial system is effectively bankrupt. It has struggled to pay salaries and pensions, including those owed to tens of thousands of people connected to the former Gaza administration. Resolving the status of those employees appears to have been one of the difficult issues in the negotiations.
The emerging formula is both necessary and sensible. People who worked in civilian ministries, hospitals, schools, municipalities and public services – and who had no involvement in Hamas’s military wing or terrorist activity – should not automatically be excluded from Gaza’s future. Those employees should undergo professional and security vetting. Where they are qualified and cleared, they should be permitted to continue serving the Palestinian public under the authority of the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza, or NCAG.
Gaza cannot be rebuilt by dismissing every teacher, engineer, doctor, sanitation worker or civil servant who worked under the previous government. The purpose of the transition must be to remove Hamas’s armed control and political domination, not to dismantle what remains of Palestinian society.
I understand that Gulf countries have apparently played a role in finding a solution for unpaid salaries and pensions. That may seem like a secondary administrative matter, but it is not. Governments and armed movements do not disappear simply because their leaders sign a document. A peaceful transition requires an alternative source of authority, employment, public services and financial stability. People must see that surrendering factional control does not mean surrendering their ability to feed their families.
Hamas has also been subjected to enormous external pressure.
Egypt, Qatar and Türkiye did not merely facilitate talks. They pressed Hamas to make decisions that it had resisted for months. Recent negotiations in Cairo brought together Hamas leaders and mediators from all three countries, and the agreement establishes a phased process involving Palestinian administration, international support and independent verification.
Egypt’s role was particularly important. No Arab country has greater knowledge of Gaza, Hamas, the Palestinian factions and the security realities surrounding the Strip. Egyptian intelligence applied intense pressure across the Palestinian political spectrum to reach an agreement.
Samir Masharawi, acting in the name of Mohammed Dahlan, was also reportedly involved in the Cairo discussions. Dahlan appears to have worked behind the scenes with senior American figures in shaping the emerging arrangement, while Masharawi participated directly in the Palestinian discussions. Reports indicate that Jared Kushner had been consulting Dahlan during the development of the Gaza process.
But perhaps the greatest pressure on Hamas did not come from foreign governments. It came from approximately two million Palestinians in Gaza.
The people of Gaza have had enough. They are exhausted, displaced, impoverished and living in unbearable conditions. They have lost homes, family members, livelihoods and any sense of a predictable future. They do not want Hamas to continue governing them through armed authority, and they do not want Israel to continue controlling their lives through military force.
Whatever support Hamas once enjoyed as a movement of resistance has been profoundly damaged by the catastrophe brought upon Gaza. Palestinians have paid a price beyond imagination. Their demand now is not for another slogan, another military confrontation or another promise of eventual victory. Their demand is for life: shelter, food, security, education, medical care, freedom and a future for their children.
Hamas could not ignore that pressure forever.
Trump’s Leverage Over Netanyahu
Hamas is not the only party negotiating from a position of weakness. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is also unusually vulnerable – especially in his relationship with President Trump.
Trump understands the leverage he holds. Netanyahu depends heavily on the American president’s political protection, diplomatic support and strategic backing. That dependence becomes even more significant as Israel approaches elections.
The agreement runs directly against the wishes of Netanyahu’s far-right political base. Ministers and parties committed to permanent Israeli control of Gaza, renewed settlement and the destruction rather than negotiated disarmament of Hamas are already urging Netanyahu to reject it. Israel’s far right has publicly attacked the plan, while Israeli officials insist that Hamas must be fully disarmed before Israel withdraws.
But Netanyahu cannot easily say no to Trump – certainly not before the Israeli elections.
Trump did not invest his prestige in the Gaza plan merely to allow Netanyahu or Hamas to destroy it. American officials have already warned that Trump would be deeply disappointed if Israel obstructed implementation.
That does not mean Netanyahu will embrace the agreement publicly. He will almost certainly try to reinterpret it, delay it, attach additional conditions to it and present every Israeli concession as an American demand rather than an Israeli choice. Hamas will do much the same.
Israel will say that it cannot withdraw until disarmament has been completed.
Hamas will say that it cannot disarm until Israel has withdrawn.
Taken literally, those two positions make implementation impossible. But agreements of this kind are not implemented by accepting either side’s maximal interpretation. They are implemented through reciprocal, phased and verified steps.
That is precisely why an external mechanism is indispensable.
Withdrawal and Disarmament Must Proceed Together
The correct formula is neither “withdrawal first” nor “disarmament first.” It is coordinated implementation.
As Hamas hands over to a Palestinian body defined categories of weapons, maps military infrastructure and relinquishes control of specific areas, Israel must withdraw from corresponding territory. As Israel withdraws, the International Stabilization Force must deploy. As the ISF establishes security, the NCAG must enter and begin governing. As the NCAG assumes authority, the new Palestinian police force must take to the streets, protect the population and begin collecting unauthorized weapons.
Every stage must be independently verified before the next stage begins.
The agreement reportedly provides for precisely such a verification structure, including an International Verification Committee and monitored, conditions-based implementation. The disarmament arrangements cover weapons, tunnels and military infrastructure, while the ISF is expected to assist with security, police training and the transition of authority.
Verification is not a technical addition to the agreement. It is its backbone.
Israel does not trust Hamas. Hamas does not trust Israel. Palestinians do not trust Israel to withdraw, and Israelis do not trust Hamas to surrender its military capabilities. No speech, promise or signed document will eliminate that distrust.
The agreement must therefore be designed to work without trust.
Each party must know that the other party’s compliance will be measured by an independent body and that progress will occur only when agreed benchmarks have been met. There must also be consequences for obstruction – whether the obstruction comes from Hamas, Israel, another armed Palestinian faction or extremist Israeli actors seeking to sabotage the process.
The international community has too often confused signing ceremonies with implementation. In Gaza, implementation is the agreement.
The ISF Must Enter Immediately
The International Stabilization Force cannot remain an idea on paper. Its advance elements must begin entering Gaza, establishing command structures, preparing deployment zones and building sufficient strength to carry out the mission.
Its task is not to conquer Gaza or to wage war against Hamas. Nor should foreign troops be expected to move from house to house searching for weapons.
The primary responsibility for Palestinian disarmament must remain Palestinian.
The ISF’s role is to provide the security framework within which Israel can withdraw, the NCAG can govern, Palestinian police can deploy, reconstruction can begin and weapons can be collected without creating a security vacuum.
The sequence should begin immediately:
The ISF deploys and builds operational capacity.
Israel begins pulling back from the yellow line in accordance with verified benchmarks.
The NCAG enters Gaza and assumes responsibility for ministries, public services and municipal administration.
The new Palestinian police deploy in the streets.
This cannot be delayed until every disagreement has been resolved. There will never be a perfect political moment. Capacity must be created while the remaining details are being negotiated.
Palestinian authorities begin registering, collecting, storing and ultimately decommissioning factional weapons under international verification.
Gaza Does Not Have Ten Years
The decommissioning of Irish Republican Army weapons in Northern Ireland demonstrates how difficult disarmament can be. The process took more than a decade from the 1998 Good Friday Agreement to the final confirmation that weapons had been put beyond use.
Gaza does not have ten years.
The population cannot remain in tents and ruins while diplomats debate the last rifle, tunnel or weapons cache. The process must distinguish between immediate security requirements and the longer technical process of complete demilitarization.
Heavy weapons, rockets, explosives-production facilities, military tunnels and organized armed formations must be addressed first and rapidly. Personal and light weapons will require registration, collection, regulation and a clear legal framework. Individuals who surrender weapons and have not committed serious crimes should be offered a route back into civilian life.
The process should be firm, but it should not be designed as collective punishment. The objective is to ensure that there is one legitimate Palestinian authority, one law and one authorized security system – not to create an endless hunt for defeated enemies.
Reconstruction Must Begin Now
The construction of the planned new city for temporary housing near Rafah must begin immediately.
Temporary housing must not become permanent displacement, and reconstruction must not be used to remove Palestinians from their land. It should provide dignified accommodation inside Gaza while neighborhoods, infrastructure and public services are rebuilt.
Housing cannot wait for the completion of disarmament. Nor can water, electricity, sanitation, hospitals and schools.
Reconstruction is itself part of the security strategy. Every family that moves from a tent into a safe home gains a stake in stability. Every young person who enters a school or workplace rather than an armed faction strengthens the new order. Every functioning Palestinian institution reduces the space in which militias can return.
People will support disarmament only when they can see what is replacing armed rule.
The Destination Must Be Palestinian Statehood
Finally, this process cannot end at the borders of Gaza.
Trump’s 20-point plan speaks of a political horizon for Palestinian self-determination and statehood. That provision must not be treated as decorative language added to gain Arab support. The path to a Palestinian state is essential to the logic of the entire agreement.
Hamas’s claim to armed resistance cannot be permanently defeated if Palestinians are offered only better administration under indefinite occupation. Disarmament must lead to sovereignty. Israeli withdrawal must lead to freedom. Palestinian reform must lead to democratic legitimacy. Israeli security must be anchored in regional peace rather than permanent military domination.
The White House has described the plan as a roadmap for peace, reconstruction and regional prosperity, while the declaration supporting it commits the participating states to security and opportunity for both Palestinians and Israelis.
That promise must now be made real.
