Gershon Baskin
Gershon Baskin, a prominent Israeli peace negotiator who is currently conducting back-channel negotiations between Hamas and Israel to bring an end to the current offensive in Gaza, spoke to JURIST Senior Editor for Long Form Content Pitasanna Shanmugathas about the complex obstacles preventing a ceasefire amid the conflict’s expansion into Lebanon and Iran, his unique correspondence with “the Palestinian Nelson Mandela” Marwan Barghouti, and how the period between Trump’s presidential re-election win and January 20th could be crucial for President Biden’s legacy in ending the war.
This interview has been lightly edited for clarity and concision.
Pitasanna Shanmugathas: Mr. Baskin, you are a back-channel negotiator between Israeli and Palestinian officials and you were doing this prior to October 7th, and you have continued doing it since then. Could you talk about how you first became involved in back-channel negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians?
Gershon Baskin: Between Israelis and Palestinians, I’ve been doing this for 46 years. I believe that if Israel aims to be the democratic nation-state of the Jewish people, it cannot continue ruling over Palestinians while denying them freedom and self-determination.
At 22, I lived in a Palestinian village in Israel for two years, doing volunteer work and immersing myself in the community. Eighteen years ago, after Hamas abducted an Israeli soldier [Gilad Shalit], I began efforts to establish dialogue between Hamas and Israelis. Though initial efforts were vetoed by Hamas leadership, I built connections that later allowed communication channels to open.
Since then, starting in July 2006, I’ve engaged with Hamas leadership, negotiating ceasefires and hostage releases, working to ease the Gaza siege, and striving to prevent further violence. Prior to October 7, I had negotiated to secure an Israeli soldier’s release after five years in captivity and sought a long-term ceasefire — negotiations that ceased when Israel assassinated Hamas leader Ahmed Jabari.
Shanmugathas: Since October 7th, you’ve conducted multiple rounds of back-channel negotiations between Israel and Hamas. Could you talk about the issues at the center of these negotiations and why, to date, they have not been successful?
Gershon Baskin: Bottom line is that Israeli Prime Minister [Benjamin] Netanyahu, whose been more or less in office since 2009, had a strategy that he was implementing to prevent the Palestinians from having freedom and liberation in a state of their own. Netanyahu’s decision spelled itself out in a way that kept Hamas in power in Gaza and kept an illegitimate or delegitimized Palestinian Authority in the West Bank. This way, Netanyahu was able to say to the Israeli people in the world, we want peace, but we have no one to negotiate with. Hamas wants to destroy us, and the Palestinian Authority leader doesn’t speak for all the Palestinians. That strategy worked until, more or less, October 7th, when it blew up in our faces last year. It turns out that you can’t occupy another people for 56 years or confine 2.3 million people to a territory like Gaza, with severe poverty, and expect to have quiet negotiations with Hamas.
I think that peace needs to happen between the Israeli and Palestinian people, but it has to be done by Hamas, by the leadership of the Palestinian people in the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).
The situation is now truly horrendous. Over the last year, with over 1,000 people killed by Hamas inside Israel on October 7th and 250 people taken hostage into Gaza, there remain 101 Israelis and foreign workers being held hostage inside Gaza. We don’t know how many of them are alive and how many are dead. And the negotiations are on trying to release them, but under the understanding that there is no release of those hostages from Hamas without ending the war, without Israel withdrawing from Gaza, without Israel agreeing to release Palestinian prisoners from Israeli prisons. There’s a package deal that needs to be done.
Where it stands right now is that unless Hamas declares that they’re also willing to give up control of Gaza after the war, then this war will just go on. More people will be killed in Gaza, more Israeli hostages will be killed, and there is no end in sight.
My understanding is what I’ve been told by Hamas leaders, that they are willing to give up governance in Gaza and transfer it to a civilian, professional, technocratic government that they won’t be part of. That needs to be materialized by Hamas into direct statements that they tell the official mediators, which are the government of Qatar and the government of Egypt. And that needs to be conveyed to the Israelis and of course to the White House, so that President Biden, after election day on November 6th, until January 20th, he remains in office as a free agent. He will be able to use [his] power or the presidency to try and influence the Israeli prime minister to agree to a deal.
Shanmugathas: I think many people suspect that Israel’s ultimate aim in Gaza is to simply ethnically cleanse the land of Palestinians. And reports have emerged that Israel is planning to annex Northern Gaza. So how realistic is it, given this pretext, that a genuine ceasefire can be achieved?
Baskin: In Israel, Prime Minister Netanyahu is ultimately the primary decision-maker, even within a democratic framework. While he has opposed extreme right-wing voices in his government who seek to annex Gaza, build new settlements, or expel Palestinians, he has also created obstacles for mediators trying to negotiate a ceasefire. Netanyahu’s political interests may be at play in prolonging the conflict, as ending the war could lead to increased scrutiny. Once the conflict is over, calls for a national inquiry, focus on his corruption trial, and pressure for new elections would likely intensify.
To reach a resolution, several steps are needed. First, Hamas must clearly communicate to Qatari and Egyptian mediators its readiness for a ceasefire with Israel, commit to releasing 101 hostages, and agree to transfer governance, security, and control over weapons. Next, the United States needs to press Israel to accept a deal, allowing safe passage for any departing Hamas leaders and integrating those who remain into a new Palestinian security force. This force, established by a Palestinian civilian government, would work to restore order and stability.
International peacekeepers, including Arab and other forces, could help enforce the peace and prevent future conflicts, supporting the new Palestinian government in maintaining security. To rebuild Gaza, billions in international aid will be necessary, but funding won’t materialize if Hamas stays in power. Hamas is aware of this, recognizing that for Gaza to receive aid, they must step back from governance. This complex plan would require strong international cooperation and commitment, with the aim of creating a foundation for sustainable peace and stability in Gaza and beyond.
Shanmugathas: Do you think US President Joe Biden has a red line regarding what Israel cannot do, which if crossed, would result in the US cutting off the aid that has been so essential towards Israel’s offensive in Gaza?
Baskin: This past week, Biden stated that if Israel doesn’t allow a significant amount of humanitarian aid into Gaza, the United States will cut off certain forms of support for Israel. This is the first time Biden has made such a statement. After November 5th, election day, regardless of the outcome, Biden will be a free agent until January 20th. During this time, he will need to consider his legacy. History will not remember Biden primarily for the infrastructure bill; he will be remembered either as the “Gaza war president” or as the president who ended the war in Gaza and freed the hostages. His legacy will be determined during this short period from election day until he leaves office on January 20th.
Shanmugathas: As a Jewish person who lives in Israel, can you talk about the enormous support that the Israeli domestic population has voiced for Israel’s offensive in Gaza?
Baskin: The Israeli public is still traumatized by the events of October 7th last year, the worst day in Jewish history since the Holocaust. People are still strongly affected by a sense of needing revenge and by the pain they are suffering. Many in Israel are reliving October 7th every day, unable to move beyond it. Similarly, Palestinians have experienced what they consider the greatest tragedy since 1948, and some even say that what has happened over the past year is worse than the events of 1948.
Thus, we have two traumatized populations, each responding to reality through the lens of their trauma. Israeli soldiers are being killed daily in Lebanon and Gaza, fueling a pervasive sense of threat, particularly from Hezbollah in Lebanon, which is perceived as seeking Israel’s destruction. This intense environment means people are not necessarily responding rationally, coherently, or logically — they are reacting very emotionally to their circumstances
Shanmugathas: Arguably, the most popular living Palestinian is Marwan Barghouti, often called the “Palestinian Nelson Mandela.” Polls conducted both before October 7th and most recently in March 2024 show that if a presidential election were held in Palestine, Barghouti would win by a double-digit margin over Mahmoud Abbas, the Palestinian Authority president, and Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar, now deceased. For the readers of JURIST who may be unaware, could you explain who Marwan Barghouti is and why he is held in such high regard by Palestinians?
Baskin: Marwan Barghouti is seen as a symbol of the Palestinian struggle by the Palestinian people. He was an elected parliamentarian, the number one person in the Fatah party in the Palestinian parliament. The last time they held elections when Marwan was elected was a very long time ago.
Marwan was arrested in 2002 for being one of the leaders of the Second Intifada. And he was accused by Israel of being responsible for the deaths of many Israelis. He was convicted and is serving five consecutive life sentences plus 40 years.
As such, Marwan being in prison all these years is seen as this symbolic figure. He came from the Fatah movement. He was one of the young people who led it, and he remains that symbol. His campaign for his release has been strong both inside of Palestine and around the world. And as you said, he beats every potential Palestinian leader in any elections that might be held. I’ll just remind you that Palestine hasn’t held elections since 2006.
And Mahmoud Abbas, the current president, who’s 89 years old, is in the 18th year of a four-year term and enjoys little legitimacy, if any. So, anyone can beat Mahmoud Abbas, but Marwan Barghouti is the chosen favorite of every Palestinian. He is kind of a black box, though. We really don’t know what’s inside of that box because he has been silent most of these years. He hasn’t spoken out and people don’t really know what he stands for. The reality of Marwan might be very good. On the other hand, it might not be very good.
And Marwan Barghouti, he will probably be released in a deal with Hamas when that deal is made. Whether he’ll be allowed to stay in Palestine, we don’t know. The Israelis may demand that he be deported abroad. And I think that if Marwan is given the choice of staying in prison or going and living in the United Arab Emirates, he will choose to go and live in the United Arab Emirates. But we will see. He has a role to play in the future of Palestine. And he is the most symbolic leader of the Palestinian people.
Shanmugathas: And you had a personal relationship with Marwan Barghouti, and I believe that continued even during his incarceration, is that right?
Baskin: Yeah, I’ve been corresponding with him over the last years. Our correspondence continued until the beginning of the war on October 7th of last year, when Marwan, to the best of my knowledge, has been transferred five different times to different prisons in Israel. He has been held in solitary confinement for long periods of time.
I understand that he has been physically tortured in prison. His condition is unknown. He is not allowed, like other security prisoners, he is not allowed family visits. His lawyer, I think since the beginning of the war, more than a year ago, has only seen him three times. So, we really don’t know what his situation is.
Shanmugathas: And could you talk about what kind of correspondence you had with Marwan Barghouti, what kind of insight you gained from that correspondence?
Baskin: Yes. This began more intensively about two years ago, and I wanted to understand Marwan’s views on various issues. We corresponded back and forth, though I can’t disclose the content as I didn’t have permission to do so. Our correspondence was confidential, but what I gathered from him is, firstly, that he still strongly supports a two-state solution, which surprised me.
He believes a solution to the Palestinian issue must be found within a regional framework, where both Israelis and Palestinians can achieve stability, security, economic growth, and hope for a real resolution. While he reserves the right of the Palestinian people to armed struggle, if necessary, it is not his preferred option. He emphasized that Palestinians have a right to resist occupation by any means, including armed struggle, but reiterated that his choice is diplomacy, political engagement, and negotiation. He is a man of principle — that’s what I understand from him. However, since these discussions aren’t public, I would feel more confident in these being his official positions if he could make these statements publicly.
Shanmugathas: It has been reported in numerous news outlets that Hamas’ top demand in any prisoner exchange with Israel is the release of Marwan Barghouti. Firstly, why does Hamas want Barghouti released, even though he does not share the same views as Hamas? You mentioned that you believe it’s likely Israel will agree to release him in a prisoner exchange. I’m personally doubtful about that, given Barghouti’s strong legitimacy and how Barghouti cannot be corrupted by the Israelis, compared to someone like Abbas. Could you elaborate on this?
Baskin: Sure. Before October 7th, there were 559 Palestinian prisoners serving life sentences or more than one life sentence, and Barghouti is among them. The prisoners that Hamas is most interested in freeing are these 559 individuals; they will be at the top of Hamas’s list, and there will likely be resistance from Israel regarding their release. Israel has demanded the veto of 60 to 65 names in negotiations, and I assume that Israel would want to veto the release of Marwan Barghouti.
I think Hamas is very interested in showcasing their victory by securing the release of prisoners serving the longest sentences, which would be a significant achievement for them. They will likely be very demanding in negotiations. Barghouti is just one of about 20 prisoners who could be seen as symbols of Palestinian resistance — or, from the Israeli perspective, as terrorists responsible for the deaths of many Israelis. This will lead to significant arguments between Israel, Hamas, and the mediators over who should be freed and the terms of their release.
Marwan is not the number one person on Hamas’ list, but he is among the top individuals they want to secure as a victory for the Palestinian people. They understand that freeing prisoners like Marwan Barghouti will be viewed very positively by Palestinians, regardless of their political affiliations.
Shanmugathas: It has been reported that Mahmoud Abbas, the Palestinian Authority leader, has advised Israel to reject any offers from Hamas that would result in the release of Marwan Barghouti. Is this true to your knowledge?
Baskin: I don’t know. I haven’t seen that reported anywhere. I don’t know if that’s true. That sounds like some kind of political spin of people who are against Mahmoud Abbas.
Shanmugathas: Israel’s offensive in Gaza has now extended to Lebanon as part of its conflict with Hezbollah. Recently, Israel killed Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah. In your view, what is Israel’s goal in Lebanon? And do you think Israel will achieve that goal?
Baskin: Right. First, I want to clarify what you said: Hezbollah attacked Israel on October 8th, the day after Israel was attacked by Hamas. Thus, the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah began with Hezbollah expressing support for the people of Gaza and Hamas in their attack on Israel.
For most of the past year, it has been a war of attrition, with Hezbollah sending rockets and drones into Israel and Israel responding with rockets and drones targeting Lebanon. The situation has escalated out of control, especially after Israel assassinated the Hezbollah leader, Hassan Nasrallah.
Israel has targeted the top command of Hezbollah’s military leadership and many political leaders, including the individual originally appointed as the second-in-command after Hassan Nasrallah. This conflict has escalated to the point where northern Israel has seen significant destruction, leaving about 100,000 Israelis homeless, while southern Lebanon has also suffered, with thousands of homes and villages being destroyed by Israel.
Israel discovered an extensive underground infrastructure in southern Lebanon, including homes, which Hezbollah planned to use for a cross-border attack against Israel, attempting to replicate what Hamas did in southern Israel on October 7th. Israel is focused on destroying that infrastructure while also targeting Hezbollah sites around Beirut, particularly in Dahiya and other neighborhoods, to mitigate the threat posed by Hamas.
This conflict has spilled over into Yemen and [Iran], leading to ballistic missile attacks by Iran against Israel, which Israel has managed to deflect with the help of its neighbors.
However, the situation remains very dangerous and has the potential to escalate further.
Shanmugathas: So, it sounds like you support Israel’s so-called “counterterrorism” operations in Lebanon?
Baskin: No, I’m not [implying] that at all. I believe these issues need to be addressed diplomatically. There are no military solutions to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict or to the conflict between Israel and Lebanon. In fact, Israel and Lebanon don’t have a real conflict; there is a border issue that can be easily resolved.
Shanmugathas: While he was alive, it was reported that Nasrallah, the leader of Hezbollah in Lebanon, rejected offers for a ceasefire with Israel unless Israel ended its offensive in Gaza. Do you believe that to be true? Even after Nasrallah’s assassination, do you think Hezbollah will continue to refuse any ceasefire with Israel unless it is tied to Israel ending its offensive in Gaza?
Baskin: I think before the killing of Nasrallah, it was definitely true. We saw that last November when there was a week-long ceasefire, that Hezbollah kept a ceasefire in the north without it being negotiated. When the war in Gaza stopped, the conflict between Hezbollah and Israel also ceased. I’m not sure that’s the case today. If the war in Gaza ends, would Hezbollah stop its military actions against Israel? I hope it would.
I know that the United States, France, and others are trying to negotiate between Israel and Hezbollah for the reinstatement of UN Security Council Resolution 1701. For the time being, Lebanon has rejected Israel’s demands, which are essentially twofold: first, Israel’s right to re-enter Lebanon if it discovers the rebuilding of infrastructure aimed at attacking Israel from the south, and second, Israel’s right to continue its flyovers over Lebanon, which violate Lebanese sovereignty. The Lebanese side rejects both of these demands.
These negotiations will continue, and hopefully, they will lead to a solution that guarantees Israel won’t violate Lebanon’s sovereignty. Lebanon needs to become an independent sovereign nation, not controlled by the militia of Hezbollah, but governed by the people of Lebanon, who deserve the opportunity to rebuild their country free from the constraints that Hezbollah has imposed for so many years. I hope for a reinstatement of peace and calm in the north and a movement toward resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
Shanmugathas: Tensions between Israel and Iran have escalated significantly over the past several months and weeks. Analysts have speculated that Israel’s aim is to draw the United States into a broader war with Iran. What are your thoughts on that?
Baskin: Well, obviously, the United States is not taking the bait and is not being drawn into a wider war with Iran. The Americans have assured Israel that they have its back if attacked by Iran. They have sent anti-rocket systems to support Israel’s air defenses. Additionally, the alliance between the United States and other Arab countries — Egypt, Jordan, the Emirates, and the Saudis — has contributed to defending Israel when it has been attacked by Iranian ballistic missiles.
The Iranian-Israeli conflict is not really about anything substantive other than the fact that the regime in Iran, led by the Ayatollahs, is committed to the destruction of Israel, and obviously, Israel will not allow that to happen. There is also the issue of whether Iran will develop a nuclear weapon, which they have been working on for over 30 years. Israel is doing everything it can to prevent this, along with the rest of the world, which does not want to see another nuclear nation, particularly in the Middle East.
The conflict between Israel and Iran also needs to be resolved. I believe the Iranian people, in general, would like a regime change. Someday they will be empowered to achieve that, as we saw almost happen in 2009, and it will likely happen in the future as well. The Iranian people deserve to be free from the regime that has them in such a dire situation. The Iranian economy is in ruins due to sanctions imposed by the international community because of their nuclear program. Overall, Iran is not in good shape, and I think the Iranian people would prefer a regime free from the Ayatollahs.
Shanmugathas: In terms of accountability for war crimes, once there is an end to the offensive in Gaza and a level of stability is achieved, questions about accountability will arise. The international Criminal Court (ICC) chief prosecutor has sought war crimes charges against Netanyahu and Defense Minister Yoav Gallant. What are your thoughts on what accountability will look like in the post-conflict period?
Baskin: If we look back in history, there has been very little accountability in Israel, and it will continue to have impunity in the face of the international community unless there is a significant change in the current situation. The chief prosecutor of the ICC has requested warrants for the arrest of both Netanyahu and Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, while also requesting warrants for the arrest of Ismail Haniyeh and Yahya Sinwar, both of whom are no longer alive.
I know there are talks behind the scenes about the possibility of dropping the request for warrants if Netanyahu agrees to end the war in Gaza and withdraw Israeli troops from the region. Usually, Israel addresses these claims of war crimes by having an independent judiciary that conducts its own investigations, which, according to the Rome Statute, enables Israel to avoid facing justice in international courts. However, we know that Netanyahu and his government have been working to undermine the independence of the Israeli judiciary, which could put Israel at risk of facing consequences in the ICC.
Shanmugathas: The international consensus for a durable solution to the Israel-Palestine conflict has been for two states along the pre-June 1967 lines, with minor mutual land swaps, East Jerusalem as the capital of Palestine, and West Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. Do you believe that such a solution is still viable? Especially given what has happened post October 7th?
Baskin: Yeah, I think there is still no other solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Those who dream of a one-state solution are not living in reality, particularly after October 7th. Palestinians need freedom, independence, dignity, and self-determination.
They have previously agreed to live in a Palestinian state in the territories occupied by Israel in 1967, with adjustments to accommodate the realities that have developed over the last 56 years. That solution is still on the table and needs to be brought to fruition by the international community. All 193 member states of the United Nations recognize the state of Palestine, with about 151 or 152 of them already doing so.
While this doesn’t end the occupation, we need to remove the veto on Palestinian statehood from Israel. Additionally, we need to replace the current leaders; neither Netanyahu, Abbas, nor any Hamas leaders are capable or willing to negotiate this kind of solution. The Israeli and Palestinian people must confront the reality that if we don’t want this war to become just another in a long cycle of conflicts lasting 100 years, we need new leaders who can envision a different future.
We won’t forget the past; each side will remember the horrific actions of the other. However, we also need to recognize that even after this war, there will be 7 million Palestinian Arabs and 7 million Israeli Jews between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea. They aren’t going anywhere, and they will have to figure out how to share this land in a way that enables both sides to have dignity, freedom, liberation, self-determination, and security.
Shanmugathas: What I found interesting is that if you speak with Palestinians on the ground, many of them feel they’ve had the two-state solution shoved down their throats to the point that they have lost faith in the notion of two states. However, the overwhelming majority of Palestinians support Marwan Barghouti, who is a vocal advocate of a two-state solution. I’ve always found that dichotomy quite intriguing.
Baskin: You’re right. I don’t think that Palestinians categorically reject the solution of two states. They want freedom and independence; they want equality, opportunity, and agency. What they do reject is the Oslo peace process, which was a 30-year endeavor that failed to achieve its goals and never had a clear, explicit endgame. They reject the idea of returning to a kind of open-ended negotiation that goes on forever without results.
However, I think if you ask people whether they would prefer to have freedom and independence in a Palestinian state next to Israel in five years or to continue the conflict, the overwhelming majority would choose the first option.
Shanmugathas: With respect to a just proposal for a two-state solution, what are your thoughts on the Clinton Parameters and the Geneva Initiative? Do you believe a two-state solution would eventually come along those lines?
Baskin: Yeah, those are more or less the lines that are going to happen. I can bring you up to date. Former Prime Minister Ehud Olmert was brought together with a Palestinian colleague, Samer Sinjlawi, and Nasser al-Qudwa, who was the PLO representative at the United Nations for 17 years. He served as the Palestinian Authority’s foreign minister, is the nephew of Yasser Arafat, and was the chairman of the Yasser Arafat Foundation. In 2021, when elections were supposed to take place in May, Nasser al-Qudwa headed a political party supported by Marwan Barghouti.
In fact, Nasser al-Qudwa was number one on the list, and Marwan’s wife, Fatwa Barghouti, was number two. Nasser al-Qudwa and Ehud Olmert collaborated to draw up a plan aimed at ending the war in Gaza. This plan includes an Israeli withdrawal from Gaza, replacing Hamas governance with a legitimate Palestinian authority that is organically linked to the Palestinian Authority but independent of Mahmoud Abbas. It proposes a two-state solution along the 1967 borders with mutually agreed-upon territorial swaps and a resolution for Jerusalem, where East Jerusalem would be the capital of Palestine and West Jerusalem would be the capital of Israel.
In the Old City of Jerusalem, which is less than one square kilometer and home to all the holy sites, there would be no exclusive sovereignty for either Israel or Palestine. Instead, a five-nation committee or governor would oversee the Old City, including the states of Israel and Palestine, along with three other nations, to ensure that all people can enjoy freedom of worship and respect for the holy places.
So, there is a solution on the table. It’s not a detailed plan, but they have outlined a vision during this period of war to demonstrate that there is a way out and a path forward. This provides a beacon of light and hope for all the people in this region that we can move beyond this conflict.
Shanmugathas: What are your thoughts on Donald Trump’s re-election win as President of the United States?
Baskin: Disaster for the United States and the world. We can hardly imagine what Trump [will] do. Regardless of the election results, Joe Biden still has 75 days to end the war in Gaza. Will Biden’s legacy be the President of the War in Gaza or the President who ended the War in Gaza? The election of Trump and the appointment of [Israel] Katz as Israeli Minister of Defense does not change the reality that to get all of the hostages home, the war in Gaza must end, Israel must withdraw from all of Gaza, Israel will have to release Palestinian prisoners, and Hamas will have to confirm that they are going to transfer the government in Gaza to a civilian, professional, technocratic council that Hamas is not part of.
Shanmugathas: With Trump’s presidential re-election win, how will this impact your negotiations with Hamas and Israel? Will Israel feel emboldened and now less inclined to seriously come to the table to end this war?
Baskin: Yes.
Shanmugathas: There have been numerous human rights reports that have concluded that Israel’s occupation of Palestinian territories constitutes apartheid. Interestingly, Noam Chomsky, the famous linguist and academic, has asserted that what Israel is doing in the occupied territories is actually “worse than apartheid.” Chomsky asserts that in the case of apartheid South Africa, the white minority needed the black labor force as a cheap source of labor for foreign corporations. South Africa created Bantustans, tried to get international recognition of them, tried to make the conditions somewhat livable; they needed the black population. In the case of Israel, however, Israel doesn’t want the Palestinian population. They would preferably like to expel them. So, in that sense, Chomsky argues what Israel is doing is much worse than apartheid.
Baskin: I think you’re exaggerating. There are indeed parties and leaders in Israel who want to expel the Palestinians and conquer all the territory. However, the reality is that until October 7th, there were about 200,000 Palestinians from the West Bank who were working in Israel. Israel began a process a couple of years ago to allow Palestinians from Gaza to work in Israel, and there are about 17,000 of them crossing into Israel every day.
The West Bank economy is largely dependent on Israel. Of course, the occupation limits the growth of the Palestinian economy, and Palestinians do not have freedom; their land is taken from them, and illegal Israeli settlements are built there. There is no sense of justice whatsoever. In my view, comparing which form of apartheid is worse is a foolish argument. We need to eliminate any form of apartheid and discrimination and seek equality, peace, and justice. Therefore, raising the question of which apartheid is worse is not productive.
Shanmugathas: Chomsky is not arguing which apartheid is worse. What Chomsky is saying is that Israel’s occupation of the Palestinian Territories is much worse than apartheid as the term “apartheid” is defined under the Apartheid Convention.
Baskin: Yeah. Okay. He is entitled to his opinion. I think it’s a senseless argument and I think what we need to do is get rid of any form of apartheid and we need to seek justice and peace.
Shanmugathas: Are you able to talk about what you’re currently doing now in terms of back-channel negotiations?
Baskin: I’m trying to encourage the sides to reach an agreement that will enable us to end the war, bring back the hostages, change the governance in Gaza so that the people in Gaza have a chance of rebuilding with the support of the Arab world and the international community, and getting the Israelis to agree.
And, of course, what we want to ultimately see is a replacement of our government in Israel and a change of leadership in Palestine. And those are all issues that I’m working on together with colleagues and friends and partners both in Israel and in Palestine and around the world.
Shanmugathas: Thank you so much, Mr. Baskin, for speaking with JURIST.
Baskin: You’re very welcome.
