I have probably written this before but because since 2007 everyone in power in Israel – from Netanyahu to the former leaders of the Labor Party – have repeated the same mantras regarding Hamas and Gaza thousands of times, it is worthwhile to raise a different voice once again. “We will bring down Hamas.” “In 48 hours, Haniyeh will be executed.” “We will target all of the leaders of Hamas.”
Since the time when Ehud Olmert sat in the Prime Minster’s Office, the real strategy of Israel has been to isolate Gaza. During the Olmert period, while he was sincerely interested in negotiating with the PLO, the general thinking was to demonstrate to the Palestinians that there could be a real difference of opportunities for prosperity and freedom if they supported moderate leaders willing to make peace with Israel. If they didn’t, they would suffer like the people in Gaza, under siege and closure.
When Netanyahu took over, it became clear that there was no Israeli interest in a real peace deal with the Palestinians. The policy of isolation remained, but its goal was to keep Hamas in power in Gaza and to delegitimize the Palestinian Authority at the same time. Netanyahu’s aim, which he achieved, was to convince the Israeli public that there was no Palestinian partner for peace. Once achieved, he deflected all international pressure from Israel from the outside, because the countries of the world bought into the lie that Netanyahu enhanced of “no partner. ” Under that shield, Israel had impunity to continue to oppress the Palestinians and to expand settlement building and Israeli control.
The entire national-security establishment, with the exception of the “security idealogues” working for Netanyahu knew and understood that the political slogans regarding bringing down Hamas were hollow and empty. They knew and understood that bringing down Hamas means reoccupying Gaza and no one in the national-security establishment wanted that to happen – even Netanyahu himself.
Reoccupying Gaza is insane even without a heavily armed resistance force of thousands. The Israeli army can do it, but the cost in human life – on both sides – would be unbearable and disastrous. And once the mission would be complete – then what? No Palestinian leader would take over Gaza from the back of Israeli tanks. Israel would sink in the sands of Gaza until once again public pressure would mount to withdraw.
Here are some axioms we need to deal with: Gaza is part and parcel of Palestine and the Palestinian people. Hamas is a homegrown political movement within Palestinian society. Hamas is a Palestinian nationalist Islamic movement and not a Pan Islamic arm of the Muslim Brotherhood. Palestinians in Gaza do not want to die, but to continue to live under the conditions that exist there makes the alternative of fighting until death for the homeland and for God a much more attractive option. The continuation of Israel’s policy of the past 14 years, which is the default option, is a bad choice and its results will bring more of the same.
THE BASIS of a new strategy must stem from understanding the above axioms and also understanding that the burden of governance on Hamas provides the roads towards greater pragmatism. The first stepping stone on the path towards a more rational strategy for Israel vis-à-vis Gaza and Hamas is understanding that Hamas is the government in Gaza and Hamas wants legitimacy.
Israel could easily “green light” the discreet engagement by some allies with the Hamas government. There are European partners whose diplomats have been seeking that kind of engagement with Hamas leaders in Gaza.
Until now, Israel and the US vetoed that possibility. The US could certainly find some non-officials with close administration ties that are qualified to make the first steps towards engagement with Hamas. The US is engaging with the Taliban in Afghanistan. The US engaged with the IRA in Northern Ireland. The US engaged with the ANC in South Africa and with the PLO before Israel was.
The Israeli government itself could make use of several secret back channels for the beginning of unofficial dialogue, supported by officials. They have used me for this in the past.
Additionally, Israel should reach out to the private sector leaders in Gaza, renew their ability to enter Israel, as in the past. While in Israel, Israel should quietly enable the reengagement of the private sector leaders from Gaza with the Israeli private sector organizations such as the Manufacturer’s Association, the Federation of Chambers of Commerce, and the Histadrut.
Israel should invite the directors of the Gaza Electricity Distribution Company – actually owned and run by Hamas but has the outward appearance of being a private sector company – for discussions of plans to extend the Israeli electricity line from Ashkelon into Gaza. This is the fastest and cheapest way to bring significant amounts of electricity to Gaza. This can be done, without ideology as a business-to-business deal.
The same can be done between the Mekorot national water company and the Gaza Municipality Water Department. The understanding would be that this is a pretext for actually dealing directly with Hamas but bypassing Israeli and Hamas knee-jerk rejections of each other.
It is possible for Israel to work with Egypt on the constitution of an Egyptian-Gazan Chamber of Commerce, even more broadly of an Egypt-Palestine Chamber of Commerce with its base of operations in Gaza. This is a body that could engage positively with the Israeli private sector.
THE GAZA agriculture sector is based on agricultural cooperatives that Israel was actually involved in helping to establish in the 1980’s. Many of these cooperatives were active trading partners with Israel and Gaza’s agricultural products at one time provided Israel with 1/12 of its fresh produce. Many of the heads of the cooperatives were trained at the Hebrew University Agriculture Faculty in Rehovot. Their training was crucial to the success of agriculture in Gaza. Those contacts can be renewed and cooperation in trade and training and be re-started.
Israel and the Palestinian private sector, from Gaza and the West Bank could initiate convening an international conference on the reconstruction of the Gaza Industrial Zone at Erez. There is room for trying to conceive of a security bubble of entrepreneurship and employment on the Israel-Gaza border with quick access to the Port of Ashdod, perhaps with a direct rail link between the industrial zone and the port.
The kibbutzim and moshavim along the Israel-Gaza border need workers and workers in Gaza need employment. Security checks, secure transportation from and to Gaza can all be set up without too much difficulty.
Peace activists in Gaza (yes there are peace activists in Gaza) and academics from Gaza should once again be granted permits to attend conferences in Israel and outside. This is an important sector of the society, which in the past had many contacts across the border and for too many years have been cut off and isolated. It is important to renew those contacts. It is also worth a try to have Israeli student organizations reach out to student organizations in Gaza’s universities.
Israel can signal to Egypt, Jordan, the UAE and any other Arab partners that it would encourage them to begin a process of working with Hamas to constructively understand how Hamas views the process of deescalation and genuine reconstruction. Here it is important for Israel to understand that Hamas does not wage war for the sake of Gaza, but rather for the sake of the entire Palestinian issue.
Appeasing Hamas in Gaza alone while leaving the West Bank and East Jerusalem under the present continual military occupation will not put an end to the conflict between Hamas and Israel. In the end of the day, it is all about the unresolved Israeli Palestinian conflict and eventually there will need to be a negotiated end to that conflict. It is difficult for me to imagine a negotiated end to the conflict that Hamas will not be part of.
Lastly, without a doubt, if I were in a position of responsibility, I would pick up the phone and call Gaza’s leaders, one by one, not to threaten them, but to propose speaking directly with them. So, in conclusion, let’s stop lying to ourselves that there are military solutions to the Palestinian issue, to dealing with Gaza or to confronting Hamas. Relying on that belief and on the old tired slogan of rebuilding deterrence will only bring us more of the same.
